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SUBJECT The New Soviet Leadership

TED KOPPEL: Even as Leonid Brezhnev was being laid to rest today, world attention focused on his successor. Who is Yuri Andropov, the new leader of the Soviet Union, and what does the accession of a former KGB chief mean to the West?

We'll focus on those questions tonight as we talk with former CIA chief William Colby, with former Soviet U. N. diplomat Arkady Schevchenko, with Vladimir Posner, English language commentator for Radio Moscow -- we'll talk to him, via satellite, from Moscow -- and with Andre Marton (?), former API correspondent who remembers Andropov as Soviet Ambassador to Budapest at the time of the Hungarian Revolution.

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KOPPEL: Good evening.

It is as though J. Edgar Hoover at the height of his influence as Director of the FBI had suddenly become President of the United States. And even that analogy is inadequate, because the KGB has no real equivalent here in the United States. It is the FBI and the CIA, and perhaps also the collective state and municipal police forces of the entire country, so pervasive is its presence and power. And the man who has just ascended to the Kremlin's most powerful post, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Yuri Andropov, was until six months ago the head of the KGB. A recent profile in the New York Times takes note of Andropov's fondness for Scotch whiskey and tennis, Western novels and music. He is said to speak near fluent English. In short, he is far more urbane than Brezhnev or Khrushchev or Stalin.

But before we look more closely at the Soviet Union's new leader, let's take a few minutes to examine the organization he headed for nearly 15 years, the KGB. Here's Hilary Brown.

HILARY BROWN: When the Bolsheviks assumed power in November, 1917, they said they wanted to erase all traces of the Czarist era. But they kept one remnant of the bad old days, the secret police. The Cheka, Communist Russia's first secret police organization, virtually copied the Czar's security police. In 1918, Cheka's founder, Feliks Dzherzinski, laid it on the line when he said "We stand for organized terror."

Under Stalin, the secret police became an instrument of mass murder. Renamed the GPU in the '20s, it killed millions of peasants opposed to the collectivization of farmlands. And later in the '30s, it carried out Stalin's great terror campaign, arresting and executing over 75% of the members of the Soviet Union's vast military and political establishment.

The purges were presided over by the GPU's notorious Lavrenti Beria, who, in the '40s, launched another general terror campaign, this one aimed at so-called "rootless cosmopolitans," mainly Jews.

When Stalin died in 1953, Beria tried to use the secret police as his base in a bid for power. His subsequent arrest and execution led to a dramatic reduction in the power of the secret police and to its subjection to tight party control.

In the mid '50s, its power further declined under Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization policy, when, for the first time, the Soviet people tasted a measure of freedom.

It was not until the mid '60s under Brezhnev that the Soviet secret police, by then known as the KGB, or the Committee for State Security, recovered its power and influence and established itself in its prime role: espionage abroad and the prevention of dissent at home. The man responsible for the KGB's rehabilitation was Yuri A. Andropov.

Arnaud de Borchgrave is a former editor of Newsweek magazine and a writer specializing in security matters.

ARNAUD de BORCHGRAVE: He has headed the world's most extraordinary secret police and foreign intelligence service that the world has ever known. It employes about 1,000,000 people. Admittedly, out of those 1,000,000, you have about 450,000 frontier guards; you have all the people who guard the labor camps, but you also have almost 400,000 employed in intelligence work.

BROWN: Ernest Volkman is writing a book on intelligence operations and has made a specialty of the KGB.

ERNEST VOLKMAN: If you meet KGB agents in the United States, you're immediately struck by the fact of how truly American they are. They look -- if you saw they walking down the street, they look [like] typical up and coming, snappily dressed American businessmen. And this was very important.

BROWN: Whereas you're saying pre-'65, they were the classic, heavy-set guys in trenchcoats.

VOLKMAN: That's right. That's right. That's right.

BROWN: Which is not to say that there are still -- that there are no thugs in the KGB.

VOLKMAN: No. But a lot of the thugs now work in the domestic division of the KGB.

de BORCHGRAVE: It silences, suppresses any form of opposition, dissidence. It has done that very effectively with a man who is still a hero to every liberal in the Western world, Dr. Andrei Sakharov, who invented the Soviet H-bomb, who was a man at the top of the Soviet establishment for some twenty years with every door to the Kremlin open to him, who is now in KGB imposed exile in his own country in the city of Gorky.

VOLKMAN: In terms of the Jewish dissidents, for example, the KGB accuses them of economic crimes as a means of fanning Soviet anti-Semitism against these people. Shcharansky, probably the most publicized dissident, was, in fact, arrested on espionage charges. No doubt that it was a KGB operation. Shcharansky is no more a CIA agent than you are. But it was very carefully and very elaborately worked out so that the KGB could discredit the dissidents whenever possible. And that's one of the sophisticated operations they run.

de BORCHGRAVE: The head of a European intelligence service put it to me this way yesterday. He said "Imagine J. Edgar Hoover, plus Allen Dulles, multiplied by 1000 becoming the new head of the Soviet Union." It is a rather frightening prospect.

Andropov is very subtle and a very subtle operative, and therefore I think far more dangerous than Brezhnev.

VOLKMAN: It's true to say that obviously Mr. Andropov had access to information that was virtually unsurpassed. It's like sitting in the middle of a spider's web. However, we tend to judge the Soviets, particularly the KGB, very often in Western

terms. It doesn't quite operate that way. In fact, what Andropov knows is what the Politburo knows, because that's what he was designed to do: to put that KGB under party control.

de BORCHGRAVE: I think that Mr. Andropov has a tremendous advantage over his colleagues in that there is a special section of the KGB in charge of spying on the high-ranking members of the regime. During their trips abroad, some have occasionally set up perhaps a secret bank account in Geneva for a rainy day, or keep mistresses on the side, or happen to be homosexuals, or have participated in orgies. He has all of the information, which gives him enormous power over his colleagues.

BROWN: After 65 years, the Soviet secret police is now a vast bureaucracy controlled by the ruling Politburo and extensively involved in espionage, disinformation and the suppression of internal dissent. That is thanks in part to Yuri Andropov. It is no longer an autonomous, mad-dog organization that can, with the snap of its fingers, execute millions. That, too, may be thanks in part to Yuri Andropov.

For Nightline, this is Hilary Brown in New York.

KOPPEL: As a former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Colby was the direct counterpart of former KGB chief Andropov. When we return, we'll talk live with William Colby, with Arkady Schevchenko, a former Soviet diplomat who defected and now lives here in the United States, and with Vladimir Posner, an English language commentator for Radio Moscow.

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KOPPEL: Joining us live now from Washington are William Colby, former head of the CIA; Arkady Schevchenko, a former senior Soviet diplomat who defected to the United States in 1978 when he was an Undersecretary-General at the United Nations. And via satellite from Moscow, Vladimir Posner, an English language commentator for Radio Moscow.

Vladimir, you have been a sometimes interpreter for us on things Russian. Give us an insight into your new leader. What can you tell us about him? You're giving a thumbnail sketch to a large American audience.

VLADIMIR POSNER: Ted, are you talking to me at this point?

KOPPEL: I am. I'm trying to, yes.

POSNER: I'm sorry. The phone just rang on the desk

here, and while I grabbed it I missed your voice. If you don't mind repeating that.

KOPPEL: No problem. I simply noted that you've been a sometimes interpreter for an American audience into things Soviet. Perhaps you can give us a thumbnail sketch of your new leader.

POSNER: Well, there's very little I can add to what I think you already know. Mr. Andropov has occupied a variety of posts. He was born in the southern part of Russia. He went to a school for the merchant marine. He was a sailor on the Volga River. Then he moved up into Komsomol work as a Young Communist Leaguer, and then into party work. He was also a diplomat, being the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary. And then later he was appointed -- he was in the Central Committee. He was Secretary of the Central Committee. Then he was Chairman of the State Committee for State, the KGB. And then again as Secretary of the Central Committee, and now he's been elected the General Secretary of the Central Committee.

KOPPEL: Vladimir, I'm not sure what surprises an American audience most, the fact that someone who could have been, or who was the head of the KGB for 15 years would now suddenly become the leader, or that someone who was not an intelligence officer all this life would become the head of the KGB.

Is that not a curious combination?

POSNER: Well, I think we have there, perhaps what you're describing, is a kind of a stereotype picture of what we're supposed to be like. The State Committee is one of many state committees. Granted, it has been blown into a certain image. But nevertheless, it is one of the committees that exists in the Soviet Union, and it does not necessarily have to be headed by a professional intelligence man, as we have now seen.

On the other hand, it is a job, like another job. And there's nothing really surprising. If you look back over Soviet history, you have to begin by saying that it's a very short history. Actually, it's 65 years. And so it's very hard to find comparisons. It's easier if you look back, say, 200 years and say, well, there's a certain pattern. We're still rather young, and it's still difficult to find any definite patterns to say, look, this is the way it's supposed to be.

So I don't think there's really that much to be surprised at.

KOPPEL: I'll come back to you in a moment.

Mr. Colby here in Washington, he was -- I'm talking now about Yuri Andropov -- he was your counterpart for a while. Did you make it your business, as head of the CIA, to find out about your counterpart? Can you add something to this profile that we're trying to put together here?

WILLIAM COLBY: Well, I tried to understand his role, of course. And I think his role was not so much that of a professional intelligence or security officer. It was rather the role of a dedicated and loyal party apparatchik, who was placed in the KGB to make sure that it behaved itself and followed party directives and party orders, and in the process to impose discipline upon the Soviet population, to make sure that they followed party control.

KOPPEL: Do you accept what Mr. Posner said a moment ago, namely that we tend to have a rather one-dimensional view of the KGB, and that, in point of fact, it is an organization that has been in some flux over the past few years and perhaps has a much more moderate image today than the one we carry?

COLBY: Well, I think it has had some changes over the years. It's had some different leaders in the past. Something like almost half of the former leaders were executed for their activities running that particular organization and its predecessors.

I think that the function of the organization has changed as Soviet life has changed. But its main function is still the imposition of discipline on the Soviet people and the assurance that no substance dissidence arises there.

KOPPEL: It was perhaps in that role -- and let me turn now to Arkady Schevchenko -- it was perhaps in that role that Mr. Andropov was most influential. And that is in more subtly wiping out the dissenters in the Soviet Union.

Can you shed any light on what kind of a man this is?

ARKADY SCHEVCHENKO: I think that, in general, Andropov is an intelligent man, and he's much shrewder than Brezhnev was. But I would say that he's typical party apparatchik. That's true. Before his appointment as chief of the KGB, he served for a long time in the party.

KOPPEL: Forgive me for interrupting. Apparatchik is a term that both you and Mr. Colby have used now. Define it, would you?

SCHEVCHENKO: Yes, I will define. Apparatchik is a man who served all his life in some kind of the party job. It's made

his profession, the party, serving in some party position all his life.

COLBY: A rough translation would be a bureaucrat.

SCHEVCHENKO: A bureaucrat, a party bureaucrat, something of the kind.

KOPPEL: Does it have a slightly negative connotation as bureaucrat does sometimes when we use it?

SCHEVCHENKO: It does have a little negative connotation, and the Soviets themselves, they don't call themselves party apparatchik. So that it's an identification that has a little negative connotation. But it's the same with the bureaucrat.

KOPPEL: Forgive me for interrupting. That also has a somewhat one-dimensional sense to it. Are you suggesting that Mr. Andropov is one-dimensional in that regard?

SCHEVCHENKO: No, I don't think so. It's just the contrary. He's not only party apparatchik, but in his position of being a chief of the KGB, he of course become a head of the really -- of one of the biggest organizations in the whole world, surely non-existent in the Free World, a spying mechanism and the mechanism of repression in the Soviet Union, and which is not known to the whole history [sic]. And I would say that during the period when Andropov was the Chairman of the KGB, he really restored its power almost to the level when it used to be under Beria or in Stalin's time.

KOPPEL: In the same way, are you suggesting?

SCHEVCHENKO: I would say certain -- not exactly in the same way, of course. But I would say that the foreign operations of the KGB were increased. And even I would say that neither in Stalin's time nor in Khrushchev's time, let's say abroad had never been like during the period when Andropov was Chairman of the KGB, that more that half actually of the Soviet personnel in the major embassies were the KGB professionals occupying the senior posts in the Soviet embassy. It's never happened before. Actually during Andropov's period of time, all dissident movements which had been initiated, especially started in the Khrushchev period of time, was crushed. And it was crushed not by such a nice way, because here he actually institutionalized the system of the mental institution.

KOPPEL: All right. Let's hop back to Moscow for a moment and Vladimir Posner.

Have you heard anything so far with which you would disagree?

POSNER: Well, Ted, I'd like to say, and I'd like you to understand me quite clearly, I'm perfectly willing to speak to you and to Mr. Colby. I am not willing at all to discuss with that gentleman anything, first of all because I see the man as a traitor to his own country. He's a man who left behind his daughter, incidentally, who went to school with my son; left behind his wife, and a man who's being paid to say what he's saying now. I totally cannot even imagine discussing anything, even the weather, with a person like that....

KOPPEL: All right. Paid -- when you say paid....

POSNER: And I do not wish to discuss it.

KOPPEL: ...paid by whom?

POSNER: Well, by someone in your country, obviously. And I simply do not want to discuss anything with him. So I'm perfectly willing to talk to you and to Mr. Colby and to any American citizen, but not to the man, to any man, for that matter, who would betray his country, regardless of what that country is.

KOPPEL: All right, fine. I can't force you to talk to anyone. But the question still holds: is there anything you've heard so far with which you'd like to take issue?

POSNER: Insofar as what Mr. Colby said, in a general way, I can agree. I feel that the word "apparatchik," again, is one of those words that's used by people, by professionals, but they're given a very negative connotation, as you've mentioned. And the man in the street just doesn't know what it is, but he parrots the word. If you want to say bureaucrat, if you want to use it as somebody who's working in a certain -- in the party, in this case, that is a possibility.

Broadly, I would certainly disagree with Mr. Colby as to the role of the State Security Committee. I do not see it as one of oppressing or disciplining the Soviet people. I see it as state security primarily. And also, I would strongly suggest that it is not an independent organization that takes its own decisions. It is part of the government, and it takes its orders from the government and from the political bureau of the Communist Party.

KOPPEL: All right, Mr. Colby?

COLBY: Oh, I think that's absolutely right. It is the

organ through which the party imposes its control on the Soviet people and insures the continued rule of the party.

I think in recent years the KGB has become more subtle, but subtle for the same ultimate end of imposing that kind of control. They are considerably more sophisticated in their operations abroad than they were ten, twenty years ago, because it's more efficient. They buy materials. They collect open material from our Congress, from our press to a degree that in previous years they didn't do, because they've learned that the really important issues in America are public ones.

KOPPEL: All right, forgive me, Mr. Colby. I'd like to take a break right now and, when we come back, direct our coversation a little more toward a further discussion of Mr. Andropov.

When the Hungarian uprising broke out in 1957 -- or in '56, rather, Yuri Andropov was there as the Soviet Ambassador to Budapest. When we return, we'll be joined by a man who was there also and who recalls Andropov, Andre Marton, former Associated Press corespondent in Hungary, in Western Europe and in the United States.

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KOPPEL: Joining us now here in Washington, Andre Marton, who was with the Associated Press as a correspondent for some 30 years and now teaches at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Mr. Marton was the AP correspondent in Budapest at the time of the Hungarian uprising when Yuri Andropov was the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary.

Andre, what can you tell us about this man from those years?

ANDRE MARTON: Well, we have seen him several times, because he was a regular visitor of the Hungarian Parliament building where the main offices of the government were. You know, Bill Colby called the NK -- or the KGB -- I'm sorry -- a subtle organization. And I think this is a good description of Andropov himself. We in Hungary, Hungarians and foreign correspondents -- there were hundreds of them then during the revolution -- we thought that there are two Andropovs really, but there was no point in asking would the real Comrade Andropov please stand, because both were genuine. One was an amiable, urbane, suave diplomat. The other was a man who carried faithfully the instructions of Moscow and played a major part in the perfidious deception of the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution, who, by the way, were Communist Party members, as Andropov himself.

He's an interesting character, we thought. We saw him several times. We didn't talk to him, or he didn't -- better to say he didn't talk to us. But we could observe him. He was a smiling, unflappable, if you will, diplomat who was lying for his country. And he was lying constantly. He was -- he was -- he had a major role in deceiving the Hungarian government of the revolution by telling them, "Oh, don't worry. Don't be concerned. The agreement with Mikoyan and Suslov that the Russian troops will withdraw from Hungary stands." And when he was accused of bringing in new troops, he said "Oh, they only came to relieve the old ones, the tired ones, and to protect the civilians who will be evacuated."

KOPPEL: It's almost, though, Andre, an occupational requirement for a good diplomat, isn't it, to be able to lie in behalf of his country?

MARTON: It sure is. You may remember that Stalin once said that a sincere diplomat is as impossible as dry water or [words unintelligible]. Well, Andropov was certainly not a sincere diplomat.

On the other hand, he was an amiable man. And he never concealed the fact that he liked the Hungarian culture, which is Western culture; he liked Hungarian food; he liked Hungarian art, and he liked Hungarian women.

KOPPEL: All right. What I would -- well, maybe we should stop on that last point. What do you mean "he liked Hungarian women?" I'm not going to let you get away with that without explaining it.

MARTON: Well, I don't know names, and if I would, I wouldn't tell you. But that was no secret. You know, he was the only Russian diplomat I know of who never made a secret of anything. He told us that he speaks English. Now Mark Toon, a great friend, former Ambassador to Moscow, was asked Sunday on the Brinkley show, how do you know that he speaks English? And Toon said I don't; I read it in the newspaper.

Well, we not only knew in Budapest that he speaks English, but he told us how he learned English and why he learned English. During World War II, he was a little cog wheel in the party apparatus. But he was sent up to Archangel to supervise and expedite the delivery and the unloading of Lend/Lease goods, which led to the question of life and death for the Soviet Union then. And of course they came in in English and American freighters, and he had to have daily contact with the skippers, the sailors. So he had to learn English. He never concealed it. He spoke also Hungarian, a very rare thing and very unusual.

Now the interesting thing is I said he didn't conceal that he liked Hungarian life, which means Western life. After he left Hungary, he came back several times as a private man, or he had some job in the party. That was before he was named head of the KGB. Why did he come back? It was no secret. Because he liked the easy-going, irreverent, if you will, life in the Hungarian capital.

KOPPEL: Andre, forgive me for interrupting for a moment. I 'd like to warn our stations we're going to be running just a little bit long, a few minutes over, and we appreciate their indulgence.

I'd like to skip back to Moscow for a moment. Vladimir, give us a sense of what we can expect in terms of foreign policy changes, if any, and if indeed you have any reason to suspect that there will be any changes.

POSNER: Well, Ted, quite frankly, I have no reason to suspect any major changes in Soviet foreign policy. I think that was made very clear by Mr. Andropov in his statements up till now. And I have no reason at all to doubt those statements. I think we're going to see a continuation of Soviet foreign policy in all its basic manifestations.

KOPPEL: Well, then maybe you'd be good enough to define for us what you think that foreign policy is in terms of U. S.-Soviet relations at the moment.

POSNER: Well, Ted, U. S.-Soviet relations at the moment are not at a very god stage, and they haven't been. I recall when we were talking on November 5th, 1980 with you, and you asked me about the future of Soviet-American relations after the election of Mr. Reagan. And at that point I said if Mr. Reagan's rhetoric is what his actions are going to be, those relations are going to plummet, which is indeed what has happened.

But it is my feeling, and in fact my certainty, that the Soviet Union all throughout this period, the two years since then, has constantly wanted improved relations with the United States. And I do feel that it is the U. S. government that has acted in a way to make those relations extremely difficult.

Now we know that yesterday Mr. Andropov received Vice President Bush and that they spoke for half an hour.

KOPPEL: What are those bells in the background? Is that at your end?

POSNER: Are you talking to me?

KOPPEL: Yes. We're hearing bells, and I wasn't sure if they were coming from Moscow, Washington or New York.

POSNER: Well, I heard no bells here.

KOPPEL: You raised an interesting point, and that is you reminded me of election night in 1980. And indeed the conclusion you drew then was that the election of Ronald Reagan versus the incumbency of Jimmy Carter would make a difference in U. S. foreign policy. It's in that context that I'm asking you why you don't think that the ascension of Mr. Andropov to the leadership of the Soviet Union will have any effect on your country's foreign policy.

POSNER: Well, the reason I say this, Ted, is that I believe the principles of our foreign policy, as outlined at the party congresses, are basic. They're not going to change from man to man. When I'm speaking now of the basics, I'm speaking about the view on war and peace, on peaceful coexistence, on relations with all the countries of the Third World, the developed nations of the world, and so on. These are not things that have been defined by one man over the past decade. As a matter of fact, they have been consistently part of Soviet policy, and I do not see these basic things changing at all.

I think that there's going to be a continued effort in the pursuit of peace, a continued effort in the pursuit of disarmament and limitation of strategic weapons, a continued effort to improve relations with the United States, as one country, and not only with the United States. And therefore, I do not see any kind of change.

And frankly, the discussion so far that I've been listening to and participating in as much as possible in my opinion is a bit jumping the gun in the sense of its trying to give a certain image of what Mr. Andropov is like. I would say that it's a negative image that is being drawn. And therefore, there's already apprehension as to how bad he will be. And I frankly don't think that that's the way to approach a new President. Rather, I would adopt a wait and see policy at the minimum. And at the maximum, I would adopt a kind of benefit-of-the-doubt policy. I think that would be much better.

KOPPEL: Well, you know us well, Vladimir. You've lived in this country; you've studied in this country, and you know that we tend to go on the basis of a track record. And here we're looking at a track record that involves 15 years as the head of the KGB. And you know what the perception is in this country of the KGB.

POSNER: That I do.

KOPPEL: Yes. So one reason we've asked you to participate in this program tonight is precisely so that you will give us perhaps something more to go on. What else is there that we should be looking for in this man?

POSNER: Well, I think that you should be looking, first of all, at a man who is representing the Soviet Communist Party, who was elected its leader at a meeting of the -- a full-scale meeting of the Soviet Communist Party, the plenary session of the Soviet Communist Party, and that therefore this is not a case of one man who had great power seizing it. It is the choice of the party itself. And that's the first thing that should be understood.

As for the qualities of Mr. Andropov, I have not met him. But I think that the record speaks for itself. He's a man who has been very capable in many different fields that he's worked in, be it diplomacy, be it in state security, be it in pure party work. And this in itself I think is a good -- soemthing to go by.

KOPPEL: All right. One of the characteristics that we have heard described is that he is somewhat more urbane, perhaps, than his predecessors, certainly seems to know more about Eastern Europe and perhaps even the West because of his linguistic ability. Is it possible that therefore we can expect a man who will reach out more to the West?

POSNER: Well, Ted, I think, in all fairness, that the late President Brezhnev reached out very much to the West, that there was a sincere desire on his part to improve relations. And if we go back to 1972 and the period when detente began, I think that was an exceptional example of reaching out to the West.

Therefore, I don't think that things such as knowledge of a foreign language, or the fact that a person has lived in the West or in the West, or somewhere, are really basic, are principal things. They can be important. They can be of no importance whatsoever.

What I think is important, though, is the policy in general of this particular country over the past years. It has been a policy of rapprochement with the West, a desire to trade with the West, to cooperate with the West, to find ways of scaling down on arms with the West. And therefore, I don't think -- although you do have this particular kind of penchant for it, I don't think you should over-emphasis [sic] the individual each time. It's always that, you know: Brezhnev as an individual; Andropov as an individual. Certainly they are human beings with their own particular qualities. But in this case we're speaking about people who are representing a country and

a party. And I think that is what should be looked at first, and not the individual qualities.

KOPPEL: Mr. Colby?

COLBY: I think the problem here is that we're not saying that the policy is going to change 100%, that there are certain fundamentals in Soviet policy and doctrine. One of them is an insistence on control of Eastern Europe. One is suppression of the Afghan revolution. One is the extension of Soviet power through its proxies around the world.

But I think with the change of Mr. Andropov, let's not overdue this subtlety and urbaneness, because this is a man who has shown that he is perfectly willing to suppress the Hungarian revolution in support of the interests of the Soviet Union. It's a man who has steadily avoided travel abroad so that he looks at the world from a very isolated point of view in the center of the Soviet Union, receiving his reports, yes, but not with any kind of personal experience of the great wide world and its marvelous complexity.

I think that in this respect, we have to say that in the years ahead, Mr. Andropov will be consolidating his position as the head of the party, if he succeeds in doing so. And in order to do so, he will probably wrap himself in an ideological flag, insisting on greater discipline, greater adherence to Marxism-Leninism and discipline in the Soviet people, and that we are in for a very cold period in terms of the relationship with the West.

There'll be a little surface talk about the interest in peace, and all that sort of thing. But underneath it, the cold steel of control will very much be there, because he needs that in order to maintain the leadership of the other members of the party who are concerned about their future and their stability.

KOPPEL: Mr. Schevchenko, a closing comment from you.

SCHEVCHENKO: Yes, I would say that it's a little bit too early to say that Andropov become a leader of the Soviet Union, because, oh, he replaced Brezhnev as a General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But it doesn't mean in any way that he also has the same authority or power as Brezhnev had.

So I consider that it would be very premature to think that he himself even would be able to change a basic element of the Soviet foreign policy or domestic policy. We have to wait and see. And I would say that still, at least now, it's a sort of a collective leadership which is in the Soviet Union. Actu-

ally it's the same group which had been under Brezhnev, because they're all "Brezhnevees." And as far as I know, Andropov never departed from the policy of Brezhnev in the past, and I never heard that he has any kind of disagreement with Brezhnev on any issue of policy of the Soviet Union.

KOPPEL: All right, forgive me for interrupting. I'd like to give Andre Marton an opportunity for a couple of closing comments, if you could in just a few seconds, Andre.

MARTON: Yes. I very much agree with whatever Bill Colby said. You said, the fact that he liked what Khrushchev described as "goulash communism" doesn't mean a thing. After-all, for 15 years he was head of the KGB. And he who was head of the KGB for such a long time can't be a nice guy.

KOPPEL: All right. And we have about 30 seconds left. Vladimir, educate us for the last 30 seconds then. What's the closing word from Moscow?

POSNER: I can only say that being a nice guy or not being a nice guy is of no importance whatsoever. I'm sure that he's a very competent man. And if Mr. Colby's assessment of the role of Mr. Andropov is the assessment of the United States government, which I hope it isn't, then, indeed, we're in for some rather cold times. However, I hope that that is not the case, and I look ahead with optimism, notwithstanding Mr. Colby in this particular case.

KOPPEL: All right, gentlemen, we've certainly had some interesting times together, and I thank all of you for joining us. I'll be back in a moment.

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KOPPEL: Coming up next on The Last Word, more on Yuri Andropov, including an interview with a former intelligence officer for Czechoslovakia. Also, a look at the problem of alcholism and news ways to deal with it, including a chance to talk with a physician who specializes in treating alcoholics.

That's our report on Nightline for tonight. For all of us here at ABC News, I'm Ted Koppel.